Dans le domaine d'étude de systèmes juridiques mixtes, on a récemment engagé des discussions au sujet des vertus de jugements axés sur le mérite par opposition à ceux axés sur l'identité dans le développement de la loi. Les jugements axés sur l'identité visent à trouver des solutions d'une façon qui créera une plus grande

I. Permixtio JuridiCa
Lke many travelers, when I return to Jerusalem, I start out by walkng through the anfractuous streets of the Old Cty, past the vendors sellng fresh-squeezed orange or pomegranate juce alongsde falafel wth chps, losng myself n the smells of wood smoke and zaatar, 1 ncense and mnt, fresh rpe produce crushed underfoot, and desel ol. And now I also always find my way to the table at the back of Ghassan's shop where necklaces and earrngs are strung together under a poster, now ubqutous n the homes and shops of Palestnans, of the new "separaton"/"aparthed" wall's path.
In a cubby hole no more than three feet by four feet, at the end of an alley across the way, Kareem, feedng hs chldren by dong the work that hs father used to do, pulls steamng hot mnt tea from the copper boler he's been payng off for five years, spoons sugar from a metal dsh n the snk nto several glasses, clps fresh mnt bought from one of the women who squat aganst the wall next to ther heaps of the herb, places the glasses on a crcular slver tray and, graspng the handle that arches over the tray wth the confidence of someone who daly maneuvers glasses of tea through the crush of endless crowds of toursts, swngs out to the shops that have called upon hs servces for the rtual hosptalty.
Kareem, and hs father before hm, had been servng mnt tea at the beck and call of the Old Cty merchants. The Israel tax authortes descended upon hs cubby hole one day and nformed hm that he owed back taxes amountng to the cost of hs copper boler. Kareem told them they could shut hm down and seze hs meager equpment; they would never see a shekel n taxes from hm.
Sometmes, n addton to the tea, Ghassan sends hs son Nabl out to get pzza for us, or plates of Knafeh Nabulseh (baked cheese topped wth crumbled orange sweetness). Sometmes Ghassan's wfe, Amra, has sent Nabl nto Ghassan's shop n the Arab Shuk wth a hot dsh of stuffed cabbage rolls, lemon quarters, pta, and, as t s contentously descrbed n falafel restaurants n Toronto, "Israel" salad -finely chopped cucumbers, scallons, and tomatoes drzzled wth lemon juce and extra-vrgn olve ol.
Ghassan cannot − he smles smultaneously proud and self-deprecatng − stop dong busness. Even wth hs frends. He wnkngly chastses hmself as he catches hmself md-sentence sayng "for you, because you are a frend, I wll sell
II. INTRODUCTION
Hummus and Falafel. "Israel" salad. Israel/Palestnan food. A palatable entrée for a dscusson on the mxed legal jursdcton of Israel.
Somewhat strkngly, assocatons between food and law predomnate n the lterature on mxed legal jursdctons, makng an elaboraton upon them a seemngly rresstble pont of entry. Ths artcle seeks to expand our understandng of mxed legal jursdctons usng Israel/Palestne's legal mxté as ts locus of nqury -and deployng food as ts regnng metaphor. The focus on Israel/Palestne as a prototypcal mxed legal jursdcton -and the use I ntend to make of food as a metaphor to understand both Israel's mxté and to get at a more dalogc understandng of mxed legal tradtons -requre some ntal explanaton.
Israel proper s a classc mxed legal jursdcton; that s, n ts prvate law, Israel has hstorcal and contemporary elements of both Common law and Cvl law, the first dervng from the Brtsh Mandate, the second from cvlan elements n the antecedent Ottoman-Turksh Empre and from the mportaton of Cvlan lawyers and legal academcs mmedately after the Holocaust as the new state was formng. The nature of ths classc mx has been wrtten about elsewhere 3 and t s not the ntenton of ths paper to explore n depth the relaton between each of these two major legal tradtons wthn Israel's body of prvate law.
Israel has another, much less noted, though equally (f not more) ntrgung mx n the doman of famly law, n whch a dzzyng array of relgous bodes of law and nsttutons compete, n asymmetrcal ways, wth the secular law of the state. Israel does not recognze secular marrage or dvorce and recognzes multple relgous jursdctons over both marrage formaton and dssoluton. Substantve areas of famly law such as almony and custody are addressed n parallel, and often competng, relgous and secular courts, accordng to parallel and often competng bodes of law. Ths mx s ncreasngly beng wrtten about n a way that challenges the hegemony of the Cvl law/Common law bnary as the core tenson n mxed legal jursdctons. Intrgung as ths new drecton n mxed legal studes s, t s not the ntenton of ths paper to explore n depth the ways n whch relgous and secular law nteract wthn Israel/Palestnan law and socety.
Rather than explore Israel/Palestne's classc Common law/Cvl law mx, or ts more dzzyng famly law mx, ths paper s devoted to explorng a way to approach mxed legal studes, through ts regnng metaphor -food -and aganst a far more vexed and volatle mx: that of Israels and Palestnans. Although the openng segment begns n Jerusalem, because ths larger, and less jursdctonally settled, opposton figures more promnently n the paper, the relevance of whether the artcle s bound to that unsettled cty, or the mx of law wthn the pre-1967 borders, or the mxed law of the occuped terrtores recedes.
The real tenson at the heart of ths artcle s between the vrtues of mertdrven uses and ntegrty-drven uses of legal mxté -both takng place aganst the background of a mundane, taken-for-granted world punctuated n surprsng ways by salence. In an attempt to get at a more dalogc, contextual way of concevng of mxed jursdctons, the paper ams to look at the back and forth between dentty poltcs n mxed jursdctons and the pragmatcs of how to 167 get along; to look at the undercurrents runnng underneath natonalst law and pragmatc, mert-drven law -through how such tensons are terated through the deology of food. The paper does not aspre to look drectly at the artculaton of ntegrty and mert-drven arguments n law, but rather to look at how law's analogue n natonalst poltcs -food -recedes nto the everyday and erupts at surprsng moments as a fulcrum of dscontent. What would be commonplace exchanges and transactons n a pacfic settng -an understandng of offer and acceptance n contract law, a falafel wth hummus -carry a freght of perls, often panstakngly temzed n a manner that perhaps only a lawyer would find ntutve.
The utlty of Israel/Palestne for ths focus upon the mundane and the salent arses from the ntuton that the taxonomc approach to both comparatve law and mxed legal studes s so ll-equpped to descrbe the dynamcs of encounter n that regon. A focus upon Israel's complex and often angushed poltcal mx makes t very dfficult to gnore the tenson-filled and warrng dmensons not nfrequently characterstc of soco-legal mxng -exactly where mxed legal studes would prefer us to focus on settled mxed jursdctons, on places where jursdcton and terrtory are no longer so openly n dspute. The rawness of Israel's most promnent bellum juridicum -not the tamed Cvl law/Common law one, nor the unweldy yet tensely cohabtng relgous/secular one, but the Israel/Palestnan one -allows us to revst the hstorcal moments n most mxed jursdctons when bellum gave survvng mxed jursdctons ther leadng characterstc. Focusng on mxed jursdctons such as Israel/Palestne, perhaps most partcularly when relatonshps are frayed, provdes an opportunty to look more closely at the processes that create the dstnctve legal self, as well as those legal selves that are more ndscrmnate and promscuous, or thrown nto confuson, or subservent.
The first (and vaguely ethnographc) part of the paper -Permixtio Juridica -s above. It lays out a prosac scene that s rfe wth any number of elements that could be explored for ther bellcose potental, from the tax authortes, to the tense assertons of authorty over the cty, to the renewals and manpulatons of commerce and a sngle economc sphere, to the nternal dynamcs between Sephardc and Ashkenaz Jews and ther relatons wth Jerusalem Arabs. In a sense, ths text has a flatness to t -just as the cty can have ths aspect -out of whch I want to eventually focus upon the mundaneness and salence of the food that figures n t.
The thrd part of the paper -Bellum Juridicum -returns to the fraught context of Israel/Palestne where law and food not only convey ther own everyday sgnficance but smultaneously haul a teeterng freght of culture and poltcs. Ths part of the paper should show a small fracton of the ways n whch banaltes such as food (and mplctly law) mght open up (or not), lke pop-up books, nto doramas of dspute and order.
Before I return to Israel/Palestne as a partcular nstantaton of the theoretcal approach to food and law that I am advocatng, and before I return the reader to the delectable offerng of wares along the labyrnthne streets of Jerusalem's Old Cty n the first part, I want to take an excurson n the second (and next) part of ths paper -Juridicum Promiscuum -through some of the domnant theoretcal conundrums and promses of the burgeonng field of legal mxté studes. It s here that I want to lay out the central tenson of ths paper, whch s a way of lookng at mxed jursdctons that forces us to take account of the dynamc that s the back and forth between mert-drven and ntegrty-drven judgments that go n to characterzng not just mxed legal jursdctons, but all jursdctons.
III. JuridiCum PromiSCuum
Food, or food metaphors, figure promnently amongst those legal scholars preoccuped wth mxed legal jursdctons. Ncholas Kasrer, n hs artcle about legal educaton n mxed legal jursdctons as a form of métssage, celebrates the move from scentfic to culnary understandngs of how dfferences mx.
4 "Legal theorsts and cultural anthropologsts," he ponts out, "have ndependently proposed to move metaphorcally from the laboratory to the ktchen" 5 to explan competng vews about pedagogy wthn mxed jursdctons lke Quebec, Lousanna, or Israel. Strugglng to push both scholarshp and teachng to focus more on the dynamcs of exchange n mxté rather than on the statc product of dstant encounters, Kasrer feeds upon the mage of the mxed legal system as mnestrone on the stovetop, predcated on the "ongong, dynamc nteracton of the component parts of the whole."
Esn Örücü also draws food metaphors to speak to the dversty of the mé-langes that are conjured when mgratons (of populatons and of legal nsttutons) stew and bubble wth local populatons and law. "When there s both legal cultural affinty and soco-cultural affinty," she notes,
[t]he elements unte to form a new compound. Ths can be depcted by the metaphor of a 'purée', ndcatng a blend so thorough that the consttuent elements are ndstngushable and nseparable, the ngredents havng been processed over a long perod of tme… However, when the movement occurs between systems of soco-cultural affinty but legal cultural dversty, then the elements do ndeed mx but stll retan ther separate dentty. Here the metaphor used s a 'mxng bowl. In the mxng bowl the ngredents are n the process of beng blended. However, whle the choppng and mxng goes on, a knowledgeable cook can stll see the bts and peces surfacng and snkng…. [W] here systems are culturally dverse both n legal culture and soco-culture we can talk of plural or dual law…Ths s remnscent of an Italan style salad where though peces are dstnct, looked at through the glass of the bowl they are ntermngled, above and below each other, a salad dressng coverng each tem… The last metaphor, the 'salad plate', resembles an Englsh salad, the ngredents sttng separately and often apart, on a flat plate… Ths s the other end of the spectrum whch starts wth purée. 
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As rhetorcal ads to lubrcate our understandng of the nature of mxté, these food metaphors seem promsng. And yet, they also reveal some of the very lmtatons that beset analyss of mxed legal jursdctons.
Whle Kasrer wants to focus, n hs work on mxed jursdctons, on the dynamic of contact between consttuent parts and the experence tself of confrontaton (an agenda for the study of mxed law that I emphatcally share), the metaphor of mnestrone offers somethng that s already cooked, already consttuted, already set, ready to be consumed wth no further ado.
Örücü's use of the food metaphor -the buffet of gazpachos, chopped salads and raw vegetables -though delghtful and nvtng, also tends to reproduce the taxonomc preoccupatons of tradtonal comparatve law that a focus on mxté seemed so perfectly posed to avod. Each specalty, even the least fussed over and embellshed, s a fully prepared dsh, not represented by ts consttuent parts and not partcularly redolent of the preparatory process, but by the whole that t represents on a menu. Ths takes us further away from Kasrer's alchemcal moment of encounter and dynamc of contact that preoccupes the body of hs artcle. The study of mxed legal jursdctons, pursued along these metaphorcal lnes, seems more lkely to reproduce what so many of us have come to see as the stale categores of comparatve law, whch are typcally and unbudgngly structured around the heavyweghts of Common law and Cvl law. The potental wthn mxté appears to be smlarly lad out as food stylsts mght, sculptng colours and shapes wth the legal equvalent of cotton swabs, glue, and glycerne to fashon an appetzng re-presentaton that looks (and typcally s) too good to eat, a presentaton of new congeres of detal.
That the food metaphors tend to focus on the final product of the mxng process rather than on the process tself s somewhat ronc for both of these scholars. Throughout ther body of work, they are both keenly attuned to the fraught, unstable, poltcally charged and dynamc nature of mxed jursdctons. That the metaphors they reach for (though proffered lke sourdough starters to keep a leavenng focus gong for the next generaton of comparatvsts) tends to the products of fixté rather than the processes of mxté may ndeed be a feature of the object of study. There s a paradox at the core of mxed legal jursdctons characterstc of most, f not all of them. Ths paradox, I would suggest, s not uncommonly, though sometmes mplctly, projected onto scholarly debates about mxté.
A. Reification and Pragmatism in Mixed Legal Theorizing
H. Patrck Glenn alludes to ths paradox when he talks about a tendency towards reficaton amongst mxté scholars.
7 And many of the contrbutors to the first World Congress on Mxed Legal Jursdctons reterate, at one pont or another n ther work, ths same characterstc, namely a descrpton of a moment of hstorcal preoccupaton, wthn mxed jursdctons, wth affirmng and fixng and keepng flux at bay. Glenn lays out hs dscusson about 'reficaton' as though there are two fundamentally dstnct approaches to questons about benefical versus pathologcal transformatons wthn dstnct legal tradtons brought about by the ntroducton of partcular legal propostons or nsttutons from another. The first approach s to assess the legal proposton on ts merts to determne whether t wll be felctously transformatve or not. The pedgree of the proposton s not relevant for determnng what s or s not felctous, or at least not preponderantly relevant. What prevals n determnatons of mert are judgements about how a new proposton fits nto and reverberates wth the rest of the logcal, semantc, and pragmatc features of the tradton. Preservaton of the status quo tends to be regarded, on ths approach, as retrograde and unproductvely stultfyng and nsular, holdng the tradton to the past for ts own sake. Ideally, nnovaton s good because t enables the tradton to respond creatvely to present crcumstances and future dlemmas. Ths s the approach of mert drven ncorporaton on Glenn's account.
The second approach reles more heavly upon a concept of ntegrty htched to the preservaton of what has been hstorcally dstnctve about the tradton. It focuses first, n other words, on the tradton and how thngs have usually gone. The relance of the second approach upon the vrtues of dstnctveness tends, n Glenn's vew, to push proponents to assess transformatve value teleologcally, one mght say, n lght of a more holstc purpose that s also beng served by the semantc, logcal, and pragmatc aspects of the tradton. The more holstc purpose would nclude such thngs as the dstnctvely cultural, lngustc, natonal, ntellectual and metaphyscal aspects that suffuse the tradton wth human meanng. An nnovaton s good because t enables present crcumstances and future dlemmas to contnue to reverberate wth and respond to chershed values of the communty and ts hstory. Ths s the approach of reficaton, on Glenn's account.
Glenn s farly clear that theorsts of mxté wll only hnder and paralyze the evoluton necessary for any legal tradton to thrve f they consstently harken to a past that, as he descrbes t, must be first refied (makng t stff and unweldy) to be reproduced n the present and future (makng the law stff and unweldy). As Glenn notes, reficaton s "a form of postvsm, because the object of postvsm s that of smply descrbng that whch exsts."
9 If ths ascrpton of postvsm s somewhat unntutve (.e., f the affilaton of those who tend more to legal communtaran mpulses wth postvsm seems counterntutve), Glenn goes on to elaborate that n vrtue of preservaton beng a good n and of tself, t confuses postve and normatve phlosophy. Legal value cannot be assessed on anythng further than the ablty of an nsttuton to reproduce what has gone before. It s therefore purely descrptve.
Further, arguments flowng from a reficaton of the past nevtably dsfavour cross-tradtonal persuasve capacty, gven that each hankers for ts own pre-contact ntegrty, further nsulatng each tradton from reason. Glenn s clear that, gven these lmtatons, the only effectve debate that propels jursts to ntellgently assess the benefical mpact of transformatons flows from debates on the mert. Beng ted to a putatvely ntegrated past hnders the ablty of tradtons to floursh and thrve.
Both Kasrer and Örücü have echoed ths poston n ther work, both ultmately favourng a move away from the natonalst, lngustc, and nsttutonal pursms that have, at dfferent hstorcal moments, predomnated n the legal systems that they examne (Quebec and Scotland respectvely). They both prefer Glenn's mert drven model of judgment as a means of generatng legal nnovaton.
And yet the work of both Kasrer and Örücü also ncludes detaled, hstorcal materal that mplctly and explctly valorzes the dstnctveness of the (typcally) cvlan legal system as t has managed to hold ts own aganst a domnant Common law standard.
Kasrer, n an artcle beautfully researched and co-wrtten wth J. M. Brsson, covers the hstory of matrmonal regmes n Quebec and how nsttutonal allance of the regmes wth French cvlan structures was ted to Quebecos natonalsm. 10 The mrrorng of French regmes n Quebec famly law -ndeed the transformaton of Quebec's cvl code nto a cultural con by vrtue of ts aspraton to reproduce n hgh fidelty the law of the motherland -was used nstrumentally by Quebecos natonalsts as a way of dstngushng Quebecos culture from an encroachng Anglo-Saxon majorty, partcularly n the perod of the 1920s. The Cvl law and Civil Code became untouchable and unchangeable (and ncreasngly obsolete as a result) as they fulfilled a vocaton to embody and reflect the dentty of the Quebecos people.
Kasrer and Brsson's artcle ends up tracng later 'progressve' developments n Quebec's matrmonal regmes n the context of Quebec's Quet Revoluton n the 1960s. The evoluton of the regmes s lent a 'progressve' hue partly because they are lnked wth the emancpaton of women wthn Quebec socety and the larger western world. Abolton of restrctons on marred women's contractual rghts and regmes that enforce the equtable dvson of property upon dssoluton of marrage are nsttutonal changes drven by the femnst movement that arose hstorcally n tandem wth Quebec's Quet Revoluton. The assocaton of benefical transformaton wth the emancpaton of women s so consstently understood as a good n the western world that provdng a hstory of changes appears to be mere descrptve socology. Ths s a transformaton that has the bedrock qualtes of a hyper good n the western world, to use Charles Taylor's phrase.
11 To queston whether these changes are ndeed 'progress' tags one as an outsder or a tresome relatvst.
12 And Kasrer and Brsson do not spend much 10 J.M. Brsson and Ncholas Kasrer, "The Marred Woman n Ascendance, the Mother Country n Retreat: From Legal Colonalsm to Legal Natonalsm n Quebec Matrmonal Law Reform, 1866 Reform, -1991 Reform, " (1996 23 Man. L. J., 406-449 11 "Practcal reasonng … s a reasonng n transtons. It ams to establsh, not that some poston s correct absolutely, but rather that some poston s superor to some other. It s concerned, covertly or openly, mplctly or explctly, wth comparatve propostons." Compare (and conjon) ths passage to the followng: "Even those of us who are not commtted to so sngle-mnded a way recognze hgher goods? That s, we acknowledge second-order qualtatve dstnctons whch define hgher goods, on the bass of whch we dscrmnate among other goods, attrbute dfferental worth or mportance to them, or determne when and f to follow them. Let me call hgher-order goods of ths knd 'hypergoods', .e., goods whch not only are ncomparably more mportant than other but provde the standpont from whch these must be weghted, judged, decded about." Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambrdge, Massachusetts: Harvard Unversty Press, 1989) at 72 and 63 12 The stance from whch ths transformaton (the emancpaton of women) s questoned as 2008 tme elaboratng upon why ths s a benefical transformaton. Rather the fact that Quebec prvate law allowed tself to bend to the progressve call of the women's movement n the 1960s s taken as the backdrop for examnng a parallel capacty wthn Quebec socety to bend away from a sycophantc mmcry of French legal renovaton.
Although there are many nterestng thngs to say about the role that the emancpaton of women plays n ascrbng normatve value to transformatons wthn legal tradtons, I want to focus on another somewhat more subtle way n whch Kasrer and Brsson evaluate the transformaton n matrmonal regmes that they descrbe. It begns wth words lke sycophantc and develops the theme through the use of crtera such as 'épanoussement' (an openng out or blossomng) and 'maturty'. These terms are not exactly assocated wth the mert-drven judgements that Glenn advocates, but they are closely assocated.
The ablty of Quebec legal reformers (through the Cvl Code Revson Office tasked to overhaul the 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada) to open themselves to the merts of other legal tradtons, wherever they have sprung up, s taken, by Kasrer, as a sgn that Quebec legal thnkers, and Quebec law, had matured; ts very openness to alterty, even an hstorcally dreaded Common law alterty, beng a sgn that t had consoldated ts dentty and shed a former crpplng suspcon and anxety about ts ablty to survve the domnance of the other. Words lke 'maturty' and 'épanoussement' are of course laced wth normatve judgements -hghly favourable ones. Lke the equally vague and yet potentally devastatng par of terms 'approprate' and 'napproprate', they dscplne and channel socal behavour. Descrbng Quebec's move towards a self-conscous legal creolzaton as a sgn of maturty, bravely unconcerned about tyng tself to a narrow natonalst past, s not descrptve socology (or not merely) but also prescrptve and normatve socology.
A new dentty s beng endorsed wth these ways of characterzng transformaton. It s a bt of an odd dentty because t s both assocated wth adulthood and wth a more youthful sprt of adventure, wth beng smultaneously settled and yet ever ready to be unsettled, comfortably uncommtted n the way of those who finally feel at home n the world (sort of mddle-aged and bourgeos). Ultmately ths dentty of maturty and openness has no more bedrock soldty than the evocatve assocatons that t rouses -whch s also the appeal of calls to resst assmlaton and oppresson that strred the pror generaton when conjured together wth an elaborate hstory that delneates the threat. By pontng ths out, I am not suggestng that the bedrock s not firm. I am only suggestng that t, too, s hstorcally contngent.
Örücü also covers the perod of suspcon and anxety that Scots law went through, a perod crtcal to ts eventual dentty as a mxed jursdcton. Just as Cvl law was wed to Quebecos natonalsm as a component of the coat of arms on the sheld aganst Anglo-Saxon encroachment, Cvl law was deployed as a marker of Scottsh dentty. As n Quebec, durng the first 'renassance' of Scottsh law after WWI, "the protecton of "the churches, the educaton system and benefical n a way that leads to serous debate s these days most typcally assocated wth cultures and legal tradtons where t s not t s not taken for granted as 'progressve.' 173 the law" gave form to the contnung belef n Scottsh natonhood and dentty."
13 A projected ntegrty of Cvl law, uncontamnated by Common law, was drawn upon by Scottsh jursts as a standard by whch to measure transformatons. As Örücü notes about Scottsh law's first renassance, t "bears the marks of the pursts, and n ther struggle wth the pollutonsts they gave up beng pragmatc but wanted to preserve one of the elements of ths mx n preference over the other."
14 Lke Kasrer and Glenn, Örücü finds ths purtancal approach stultfyng for the legal tradton, endorsng, as an alternatve, "choces made on mert rather than emoton." To renew tself, Scots law must no longer "hanker after the past". Lke Kasrer and Glenn, whose very use of words lke sycophancy and reficaton tps the descrptve balance n a new normatve drecton, words lke purst and pollutonst are already posed to do the normatve work of dentfyng benefical transformatons that have occurred and morally fortfyng us for those that are to come.
B. The historical Contexts of Reification and Pragmatism
Thus far ths underlnng of the normatve heft of the values of emancpaton and cosmopoltansm s not partcularly novel. I should also stress, n addton, that I am not rejectng the stance that s advocated by these terms. I am, rather, pontng out that they may ndeed arse at a partcular hstorcal juncture and acqure greater or less currency as a result of that juncture. The pont at whch a group can consder ts past as sufficently settled that t does not need to be hankered after may well be that pont where the dentty that the pror generaton sought to shore up s sufficently ensconced and at home n the world. In the common preoccupaton of many mxté theorsts, the domnance of the Common law world has been kept at bay by the agtaton of natonalst cvlans; ndeed the fact that Cvl law that survved n jursdctons colonzed by Common law not only renders the jursdcton mxed, but s also drawn upon wth prde as a sgnficant model for the broader world of comparatvsts. Where mxed jursdctons used to be the bastards of the comparatve world, they are now the darlngs. As Palmer ponts out (wth some prde), "mxed jursdctons are clearly becomng of greater nterest n the wder world….As harmonzaton efforts and globalzaton trends contnue, there s a greater need for accommodaton between Common law and Cvl law deas and nsttutons….
[T]he classc mxed jursdctons, rather than Europe's stepchldren, are actually the forerunners of her future."
15 A nonchalantly bold sprt of cosmopoltan openness and a colourful past of blasé famlarty and common mnglng are strrng character trats for a new heroc dentty.
I would suggest, out of the strrng and evocatve use of termnology drawn upon by mxté theorsts, that mert-drven judgement and judgements that call upon on the past are not really qute such dsparate approaches to new legal propostons as Glenn suggests, but rather more closely wed to the same hstorcal processes that gave rse both to the naton state and ts current demse. Both are famlar rhetorcal devces that are deployed at dfferent tmes and for dfferent reasons. A far deal of the contemporary currency of the language of openness and maturty and post-natonalsm comes, I would suggest, from the pecular hstores of mxed jursdctons, partcularly from the way they are predomnantly set out n the lterature as founded upon a tenson between a domnant Common law and a fragle cvlan tradton; and also partcularly at the contemporary hstorcal juncture where all state based legal systems (hstorcally almost exclusvely ether Cvl law or Common law) are losng ther offical lawmakng monopoles. I am hopng that f I can elaborate a lttle bt more on ths process, then mxté studes may well be more securely on ther way to focusng upon the agonstcs of encounter rather than ts products, as Kasrer, Örücü, Glenn, and many mxté theorsts are pushng us towards. I wll return to 'Israel' food and Israel as a mxed jursdcton once I have lad out ths problematc.
C. Legal traditions as Bullies
Mxed jursdctons are routnely characterzed as those jursdctons "at the ntersecton of Cvl law and Common law"
16 -a characterzaton that I (along wth a growng body of others) find too narrowly restrcted to a numberng system wth only two values. I wll address ths ssue later, but for now, I want to focus on one of the other recurrng themes n mxté scholarshp, namely that n vrtually all mxed jursdctons wthn ths bnary framework, the Common law s perceved as a domnant and at tmes oppressve force and the Cvl law, n the majorty of mxed jursdctons, needs to struggle to affirm ts dentty and to shore up the cvlanness of ts nsttutons or rsk beng swamped n a Common law sea.
The only well-known wrter (generally wrtng outsde the mxté canon) who descrbes the vulnerablty of the Common law n a jursdcton overwhelmed by the Cvl law s Perre Legrand, wrtng aganst European codficaton on the cvlan model. 17 He struggles to shore up a deep and chosen Common law tradton aganst a shallow assault by a cvlan sham cosmopoltansm that appears wlfully blnd to the way n whch a proposal to codfy Common law s not a neutral nsttutonal act, but rather a transformaton desgned to run roughshod over the dstnctve mentalté of Brtsh Common law wthn the European context.
The bulk of other wrters analyzng the ntersecton of Common law and Cvl law pont to the fraglty of the cvlan tradton and the tendency of the Common law to overwhelm the cvlan nsttutons n ts mdst. Some mxté scholars seek to understand the procedural and substantve subtletes that seem to render ths progresson nevtable wthout the further buttressng of the Cvl law. Others are more frank about the bald poltcal underpnnng of the ten-175 son between the two systems. Smth, for example, one of the early thnkers on mxté, remarks n the Scottsh context that "Common law nfluence prevaled, not necessarly on account of superorty n qualty, but as a consequence of poltcal supremacy…. The Anglo-Amercan Common law has never been receved voluntarly on account of ts ntrnsc merts alone. It has extended ts nfluence through mandate, colonsaton, conquest or cesson."
18
The recurrng theme of cvlan fraglty can be seen n jursdctons other than Quebec, and Scotland covered above. Max Loubser 19 tes the turnng of a tde of Brtsh mperal dsregard for the cvlan and Roman-Dutch law assocated wth the conquered Afrckaaners "to the resurgence of Afrkaner natonalsm n the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, the establshment of Afrkaans-language law facultes at Stellenbosch n 1920 and Pretora n 1930, and the foundng n 1937 of the Afrkaans-medum … [Journal for Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law], wth several other manly Afrkaans-language legal journals to follow."
20
The resurgence of Cvl law n ths mxed context was also a consdered and self-conscous choce assocated wth the preservaton of a beleaguered natonal dentty. A.N. Yannopoulos offers a lteral lament vocng the same anxety over the loss of a brllant cvlan dentty n Lousanna n the face of nsdous and overpowerng, f not barbarc, Common law mpostons and encroachments.
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Whatever the mxed jursdcton, a runnng theme that each of these tradtons seems to have wrestled wth s the fraglty of collectve cvlan dentty n the face of a pervasvely domnant and domnatng Common law one. Put more generally, a recurrng theme n mxté appears to be asymmetres of power between dstnct socal groups and the way that the law has been marshalled n that struggle. If legal tradtons are mxed, t appears to be because proponents of the weaker tradton have wrestled wth the problematcs of collectve legal dentty n the face of an array of subtle asymmetres of power between one member of the mx and the other.
Israel stands out, perhaps, (wthn the bnary mx of Common law and Cvl law) n manfestng a more conspcuous nonchalance about the domnance of the Common law or the Cvl law; a more conspcuously pragmatc choce to pck whchever legal nsttuton or proposton holds greater mert n the crcumstances. No doubt ths nonchalance can be attrbuted to Israel's equal ndfference to ether as a colonzng force gven that the rse of a Jewsh dentty assocated wth the state of Israel dd not partcularly see the colonal Common law of the former Brtsh Mandate as less of a threat than the Cvl law from a vcously hostle Europe. And the legal tradtons of Europe and North Amerca tend not to be the alter that rases a spectre wth Israel.
Food metaphorsts Örücü and Kasrer, then, have company n referrng to and analyzng a perod of natonalst (typcally cvlan) prde wthn the hstory of dverse mxed jursdctons. They also have company, however, n valorzng the dentty of creolzaton and cross-pollnzaton. Even Yannopoulous's Requem for a Cvl Code s answered by Hector MacQueen's plea that a future-orented mxed law be not mred n (to use Glenn's term) a refied past. Whle the bulk of wrters refer to a perod of natonalst prde wthn the hstory of dverse mxed jursdctons, just as many wrters advance mxté as a new vanguard of both comparatve studes and offer tself as a renewed source of prde. As MacQueen says, "Once upon a tme, to say that the future looked mxed expressed the vew of a pessmst; perhaps, at least n the context of law, t may become the characterstc outlook of the optmst."
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D. Binary Opposition or Mobius Strip?
These two groups of wrters, proud of a dstnctve past and proud of the dstnctve contrbutons of mxté to the future shape of the comparatve law world are often one and the same people. Ths leads me agan to wonder whether Glenn's descrpton of two dstnct and dvergent approaches to mxté s qute apt, or whether ndeed these are not two aspects of the same phenomenon, perhaps at dfferent hstorcal moments, or called upon to do dfferent tasks. There are several reasons to be suspcous of yet another bnary opposton n mxté scholarshp. The first s the fact that, as many mxté theorsts pont out, all legal systems result from a mxture of foregn and local elements.
Danel Vsser's comment that "[]n one sense most of, f not all, the legal systems of the Western World are mxed, as almost any system that one cares to sngle out has been bult up from a varety of dsparate sources" 23 s shared (also almost n passng) by many mxté theorsts. Ths recognton of the open and dalogc nature of all cultural phenomena s quckly answered by the same metaphorc range of comprehenson that Örücü struggles for above. The stale structuralst comparatve law classficatons nto a bnary world of Common law and Cvl law clearly doesn't account for the multfarous phenomenon of exchange characterstc n those jursdctons where encounters between the systems have been ntense. Vsser, followng Vernon Palmer, responds to ths taxonomc falure, however, by callng for a further set of subdstnctons: "[t]he fact that some systems are classfied as mxed means that those gvng these systems ths appellaton must have a certan measure of mxng or a partcular knd of mxng n mnd."
24 He recaptulates Palmer's focus on "the specficty of the mxture" n a way that echoes Örücü's range from purées to salad plates, descrptvely quantfyng how much blendng between the Common law and Cvl law has gone on. Ths refined taxonomy bult upon comparatve law's already stark bfurcaton of legal phenomena seems to compound the falures of tradtonal comparatve law, not cure them. If the term "mxed legal jursdcton" (or "mxté") was nvented, as Palmer ponts out, n recognton of a falure of classficaton among legal famles, perhaps the soluton s not the addton of a new ntermedary classficaton, a 'thrd famly of law', but rather a revstng of the practce of classficaton altogether. Ths s where, I would suggest, food metaphors tend to represent more of what food stylsts do than the practces of gourmets and gourmands (along wth fast order chefs, exhausted housewves, and the hungry hordes).
The relance of mxté scholars upon an already mpovershed bnary taxonomy s one reason to be cautous around the apparent choce between mert drven and reficaton coloured ways to dstngush the advantageous from the perncous n legal propostons. Another reason to be wary s that dong so may dstract us from the very dynamc and dalogc moments of encounter wthn all legal tradtons that Kasrer s hopng the next generaton wll focus upon. If the term was nvented, as Vernon Palmer ponts out, n recognton of a falure of classficaton among legal famles, perhaps the soluton s not the addton of a new classficaton, but rather a revstng of both the practce of classficaton and the knds of thngs that seem to be gong on when dfferent strateges -reficaton or pragmatsm -are nvoked.
My concern here also comes out of the recognton that "most of, f not all, the legal systems of the Western World are mxed." It comes out of recognzng that the knd of tenson that Glenn artculates about reficaton and mert also has a counterpart wthn both of the separate Cvl law and Common law worlds. It s not, n other words, a tenson that only characterzes debates and tensons wthn mxté.
E. hermeneutic and grammatical Readings as a Mobius Strip of Ideology: An Analogy
The queston about whether jursts should be drven by the merts of an nnovaton or whether they should be responsve to the course and trajectory of past nnovatons has an analogue n an artcle by Mtchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser n a 1997 Utah Law Revew artcle. 25 The overlaps n the tenson that he sets up between hermeneutcal and grammatcal readngs of texts are not completely concdent wth Glenn's tenson between mert and tradton-drven judgments, but they are nformatve nevertheless, partcularly as they come n a comparatve law artcle about outsder perceptons of the Cvl and Common law tradtons respectvely and the tendency of outsders to refy a foregn legal tradton n much the same manner of the natonalsts and pursts descrbed by Glenn, Kasrer and Örücü.
Lasser begns hs artcle by talkng about the proclvty of Amercan comparatve law wrters to set up French cvlans as a rgd formalst fol for Amercan pragmatsm. Comparatvsts John Dawson and John Merryman concentrate, n ther wrtngs on Cvl law, on salent features of French cvlan judgements such as the absence of concurrng or dssentng opnons, the absence of reference to pror court decsons, the absence of reasons for judgment, and the mpersonal, unsgned, hghly stylzed structure of French judcal decsons. These evdent features of French Cvl law lead Dawson and Merryman to characterze the cvlan system as hghly formal and the relatonshp between judges and the law, projected and organzed by an overarchng cvl code, as a mechancal one. Judges are merely the vehcle of the law, usng an absolute mnmum of dscreton and drawng upon no extraneous sources for judgment apart from the dctates of legslaton. In ths regard, French cvlans are the formalst other to Amercan judcal pragmatsm, whch tends to present tself (especally n the perod durng whch legal realsm held sway n the academy) as supplely responsve to the socal, poltcal context n whch the law operates, both hstorcal and contemporary. Amercan judcal dscourse s characterzed by personalzed, actvely engaged judges nfusng legslaton wth meanng by actvely nterpretng t n lght of the surroundng actualtes n whch t was crafted and wll be mplemented.
Lasser begns wth what he characterzes as ths naïve portrayal (of each tradton) and carres out ethnographc research wthn the French court structure. He speaks to a dverse range of French jursts, n ther own language (legal and mother tongue) to decpher the partcular emphases that nsders put on the objects, deas and nsttutons that they use. He accesses a wde range of reasonable and commtted legal actors who make sense of and crtque ther own legal system to arrve at vared, nuanced, and often crtcal understandngs of judcal decson makng. He lstens for multple and conflcted voces about the salence and relatve mportance for nsders of features of French judcal decson makng. He also attends to the actual practces and hdden facets that structure French judgments rather than the publc face of legal formalsm that s presented also to nsders as orthodoxy. In ths manner he habtuates hmself to both the contngency and apparent necessty of French legal dscourse through tackng back and forth between offical presentatons and heterodox understandngs.
Where Dawson and Merryman projected a duplctously hdden and masked pragmatsm upon French formalsm, Lasser uncovers nsttutonal arrangements, prncpally n the functons of the Magstrat and Avocats-Général, where the knds of socally responsve, hstorcally senstve, jursprudentally attuned, contextually open features that Dawson and Merryman attrbute to Amercan judcal dscourse have a home wthn French legal processes.
Lasser then turns hs analyss to the putatvely supple, pragmatc, and more unabashedly personalzed style of Amercan legal judgment and uncovers a backgrounded formalsm that mrrors the backgrounded pragmatsm of the French system. Where pragmatsm and formalsm are bfurcated n two separate nsttutonal spheres for the French, Lasser ponts out that the Amercan tenson between these two dscourses s located wthn the structure of the judcal opnon tself. The ubqutous judcal test generates an mbedded, rule-drven formalsm that dsplaces the apparently controllng prmary text (for example statute or consttutonal clause) whch allowed for the first play of contextual, personalzed, socally responsve and flexble judcal nterpretaton.
So far Lassers' analyss s ntrgung of ts own account. But t s the further analyss that he generates from ths layout that I want to borrow to rethnk Glenn et al's opposton between mert-drven and 'refied' decson makng wthn mxed legal tradtons. I am hopng that t becomes apparent, out of ths analyss, why Israel/Palestne as a mxed jursdcton (though not as conceved Vol. 26(1) Israel and Legal Mixité 179 by current theorsts of Israel's mxté) s a potent field n whch to focus upon the dynamcs of encounter that Kasrer s advocatng for mxté studes.
Lasser borrows from lngustc theory to step asde from the formalst/pragmatst opposton that comparatvsts had used as a heurstc and asks us to focus nstead upon grammatcal and hermeneutc readngs of texts, conjoned wth deology, to understand the complex presence of both approaches wthn legal tradtons and the seemng nablty of Amercan comparatvsts to apprehend ths complexty and rchness wthn ther counterpart legal tradton.
Grammatcal readngs of text post the possblty that readng can consst of no more than drect and unmedated applcaton of the language of the text. Ostensbly, French judcal practce s grammatcal n nature: judges mechancally apply the text wthout further need of nterpretaton dervng from any number of contextual sources. Hermeneutcal readngs, on the other hand, are orented to nterpretng the text n terms of hstorcal, poltcal, socal, economc, relgous, or other theory; n lght of a larger background of thought and experence n whch the text makes sense. Ostensbly, Amercan judges attends to these nterpretve practces when they recur to pror jursprudence, or the subtletes of the context n whch the law was crafted and n whch t wll be appled.
Lasser argues that each respectve legal tradton has an offical portrat that emphaszes, for nsders and foregners alke, one or the other of these approaches to texts as representatve of the core of the system's legal sensblty. But each tradton also, of necessty Lasser would argue, has unoffical locales where the alternatve approach s embraced and nourshed. For the French, ths locale s dspersed nto alternatve and complementary nsttutonal functons where contextual nterpretaton s gven freer regn; for the Amercan the space for grammatcal readngs s relegated to the bndng and unmedated nature of judcal tests.
Both approaches are, of necessty, present n each tradton, though more or less offically fore-grounded, because certanty and flexblty, stablty and socal responsveness, are ndspensable components of each legal tradtons (ndeed lkely of all legal tradtons, though Lasser does not explore ths pont.) Grammatcal and hermeneutc modes of readng do not, and perhaps cannot, Lasser argues, exst ndependently of one another.
Although dfferent combnatons of modes of reasonng characterze dfferent legal tradtons, along wth dfferent locales for each to floursh, the partcular configuratons of dscourses around these modes of nteractng wth texts arse n hstorcally and culturally contngent ways. An offical emphass on one or the other mode of nteractng wth texts wll reveal, to the legal ethnographer, a crtcal aspect of the dscrete legal sensblty of each -the publc, orthodox, and deologcal presentaton of the tradton to tself and to outsders. But falng to perceve the nterplay between the orthodox and doxc components of a form of lfe, the tenson between the deal representatons and actual consttutve practces, would generate the knd of thn comparatve analyss that Lasser accuses Dawson and Merryman of producng -analyses that, Lasser ponts out, renforced ther own partcular, hstorcally and culturally contngent, deologcal needs at the tme.
F. Applying the hermeneutical/grammatical Analogy to the Mobius Strip of Identity/Pragmatism
What Lasser lays out wth hs descrpton of grammatcal and hermeneutcal modes of legal reasonng and hs hghlghtng of the deologcal and contngent sources for favourng one or the other n offical portrats of a legal system does not exactly fit squarely wth how I want to use hs analyss n the context of ths paper. What Glenn calls mert-drven judgments does not clearly lne up wth ether grammatcal or hermeneutc readngs of texts. I suspect Glenn would argue, and Örücü would concur, that mert-drven judgments wll sometmes concde wth a strct and drect applcaton of a legal text to an mmedate stuaton and wll sometmes draw upon the larger socal, poltcal, and hstorcal context n order to arrve at a just or pragmatc resoluton. Gven that Glenn descrbes the tendency to refy a tradton's past for mmedate reproducton as a postvst nterventon, I suspect he mght also see such a maneuver as grammatcal -the refied text requres unmedated applcaton wthout persuasve nfluence nvadng from a context extraneous to the tradton. However, gven that the arguments from a 'refied' natonal, lngustc, or cultural past tend to nsst that ths background mpnge upon how texts are mmedately nterpreted, t s easy to see how ths approach mght correspond qute easly wth hermeneutcal readngs. Judgments that seek to reproduce the past can be consdered socally responsve -wth responsveness drected to a tenson between an embattled group that seeks to preserve and reproduce tself, and a domnant group that seeks to preval by ntroducng ts sensblty ntersttally nto the form and content of judgments. In other words, t's not easy to see how Lasser's analyss s echoed n the tenson between pragmatsm and reficaton (or dentty poltcs) that Glenn sets out.
The overlap that I want to lay out comes more from a sense of the hstorcal and cultural contngency of legal tradtons presentng themselves as focused on mert-drven judgment as opposed to what I would prefer to call ntegrtyfocused judgment (rather than refied). Just as grammatcal and hermeneutc modes of readng do not and cannot exst ndependently of one another, so mert-drven and ntegrty-focused judgments do not and cannot exst ndependently of one another. Each legal tradton, Common law and Cvl law, ndependently of each other, has known moments, extensve or not, where reproducng the past s vtal; where the ntegrty of partcular judgments s dependent also on the partcular judgment beng consstent wth an establshed ntegrty n the law, drawng upon a pror communty of practtoners and jursts. As much of the comparatve lterature on legal transplants has revealed, the maneuver of creatng a legal dentty self-conscous of ts contours, n opposton to a dstnct legal other, self-conscous of the other as a fol (good or bad) s a famlar one.
Each has also known moments when the overall dentty and consstency of the tradton s not foregrounded, but emphass s placed, rather, on how to proceed n ths partcular stuaton.
g. Connecting Lasser to glenn through Wittgenstein
An excursus through a passage from Ludwg Wttegensten (famlar to jursprudence) should llumnate clearly the lnks between hermeneutcal and grammatcal readngs and the mert-drven and ntegrty-focused judgments. The passage s meant to trouble our understandng of what t s to follow a rule (an arrow, for example, or a statutory secton). Does the rule tself contan all the necessary drecton for how t s to be followed (does t operate grammatcally, drven by ts own mert) or does t requre a further step of nterpretaton to be operatve (does t of necessty requre a hermeneutc nterventon, drawng upon a hgher order set of rules derved from, for example, past practce)? "A rule stands there lke a sgn-post," Wttgensten starts.
-Does the sgn-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does t shew whch drecton I am to take when I have passed t; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where s t sad whch way I am to follow t; whether n the drecton of ts finger or (e.g.) n the opposte one? -And f there were, not a sngle sgn-post, but a chan of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground -s there only one way of nterpretng them? -So I can say, the sgn-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: t sometmes leaves room for doubt and sometmes not. And now ths s no longer a phlosophcal problem, but an emprcal one.
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Wttgensten's asserton that ths s an emprcal queston s strkng -and also relevant for how to dstngush benefical from pathologcal transformatons wthn legal tradtons when confronted wth a new legal proposton. Also relevant s hs asserton that sometmes the arrow or sgn post leaves no room for doubt (.e., can be read grammatcally) and sometmes not (callng for hermeneutc readngs).
An arrow on ts own ("the dead lne on paper") n a sense, cannot pont on ts own. Ths s a realty comparatvsts are famlar wth. When Harry Barker ponts out that "the practce of law s dfficult enough of tself wthout addng to ts dfficultes by oblgatng ts practtoners to find ther way through ts anfractuostes n several languages", he underlnes, n those mpled dfficultes, how readng a legal text, ether n one's natve language or, more nsurmountably, n a foregn tongue, s not sufficent to understand how t operates.
27 Panstakng famlarty wth the way that a partcular legal communty uses and makes sense of the text ponts to ts meanng and sgnficance. The text on ts own wll not do that. The novtate or outsder s bound to blunder and take mscues from solated legal texts, unnformed by how the communty that uses the text nfuses t wth meanng through use, through dsuse, and through creatve usage. And yet, for those who have become proficent and fluent n the text's sgnficance and meanng, the text does ndcate how to go on, how a partcular stuaton should be read n ts lght.
For an outsder or a novtate, the text s relatvely nert (anmated only to the extent of an overlap wth ordnary language -and then not always) wthout an understandng of the conventons and practces that a communty of pract-toners have establshed as normatve. An nsder also, n the event of perceved need to re-affirm the text's sgnficance wthn the practce of those who have panstakngly establshed the mert of a partcular approach, has self-conscious awareness of how those conventons and practces need to be marshalled and affirmed. The hstorcal and culturally contngent conventons (consttutve of a practce) about how to read a text need to be learned n order for the text to be more than nert (and of course, workng backwards, the conventons of a mother tongue also need to be acqured for words to be anmated such that an arrow ponts "n the applcaton that a lvng beng makes of t".
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) Gven the hstorcal and cultural contngency that mark a practce, the mportance of an emprcal, rather than phlosophcal (or ndeed wholly mert-drven, .e., wthout recurrence to the practce) exercse becomes apparent. The text only makes sense wthn ths knd of a context (and hence sometmes requres hermeneutc readngs).
Once proficency has been acqured, however, and the senses and sensbltes accordngly refined, then followng the arrow s not done randomly. Nor does the arrow need to be nterpreted at every juncture. The rules do not fall apart. The text s followed n the way that the proficent have learned to follow them -and t s the text (the "dead lne on paper") that tells one how to go on. Sometmes the arrow or text or rule leaves no room for doubt. The anfractuous streets lead comfortably, n a famlar way, to a destnaton -grammatcally, so to speak. But the 'sometmes' n that sentence also ntmates that t wll not be determnable, n advance, as f by a rule, when grammatcal readngs are approprate rather than hermeneutcal. It wll not be determnable n advance when a grammatcal readng wll be a pathologcal nterpretaton and when t wll be a benefical one. Sometmes the rule (the dead lne on paper) wll tell us that the wrong drecton has been taken. And sometmes the practce surroundng the rule wll. Some grammatcal readngs don't bear the mark of a practtoner who has mastered the practce but rather the mark of one who s tmd and nexperenced and stll mechancal n ther practce. 29 Smlarly, some hermeneutcal readngs bear the mark of one who does not yet know the sgnficance of a doubt, someone whose transgressons appear juvenle and pretentous, someone does not yet know how to deftly call upon the resources of the tradton and play wth them.
h. Application to Identity/Pragmatism Tension
A masterful hermeneutcal readng can convnce us that the most smple of grammatcal rules s fraught. Extraordnarly convoluted and complex readngs can dstort the clarty and resolve that the stuaton calls out for.
Just as one cannot know n advance whether grammatcal or a hermeneutcal readng of a text s called for, smlarly t must be premature to determne as a 28 Ths s a slght dstorton of paragraph 454 of the Philosophical Investigations whch reads, n part, "The arrow ponts only n the applcaton that a lvng beng makes of t." See supra note 26 at para. 454. 29 I am remnded of Ambrose Berce's definton of a lawyer: One sklled n crcumventon of the law. The Devil's Dictionary (USA: Oxford Unversty Press, 1999) (Also relevant s hs definton of logc: The art of thnkng and reasonng n strct accordance wth the lmtatons and ncapactes of human msunderstandng).
rule that mert-drven (pragmatc) judgments and ncorporatons are tmely now, are mature and open, and wll generate a profluence of benefical transformatons wthn a legal tradton. Some of those pragmatc mert-drven judgments wll only be apparently mert-drven and wll mask an unsophstcated grasp of the complex and delcate tapestry of conventons that have been panstakngly groomed nto ther contemporary form. Some of those pragmatc mert-drven judgments wll fal as they too narrowly reproduce a formal and postvstc understandng of the text's (or legal nsttuton's) sgnficance, leavng lttle room for apprehendng the full resonance of how an ncorporaton nteracts wth other elements of the tradton. Some of the pragmatc mert-drven judgements wll fal for beng oblvous to the ways n whch a more domnant tradton has cleverly nserted ts own contngent crtera of proficency and competence n the place of one that was otherwse sufficent, despte ts seemngly arbtrary and hstorcally accdental provenance. Some of them wll fal for any of the multfold ways that grammatcal readngs of texts are nadequate to the task at hand and are nadequate unto themselves. And, of course, the same set of problems could be attrbuted to ether an overly hermeneutc emphass n approach; to one too emphatcally focused on the overall ntegrty of the tradton at the expense of nnovaton, or one focused on contextual responsveness and flexblty at the expense of the certanty and predctablty that comes from a body of determnatons made n a prosac and straghtforwardly grammatcal way.
It starts becoming apparent (to me at least) that determining what is meritorious and what is not is by no means as straightforward an exercise as Glenn or Örücü or Kasirer were intimating. The 'maturity' of openness to alterity is no longer self-standing virtue when the bonds of the community are under threat and failing. Pragmatism, or 'what works', will not be determinable (or will not always be) in advance of assessing (in elusive normative terms) the impact on the overall tradition. And assessing the impact on the overall tradition (more a commitment of purists and reifiers -to use Glenn and Örücü's language) will not be possible without make elusive normative assessments of whether or not something 'works' in a particular situation.
Just as the French and Amercan legal tradtons that Lasser conjures present an offical portrat both for nsders and for outsders, one that respectvely portrays the core of the tradton as grammatcally or hermeneutcally focused; and just as, stemmng from the necessty of practces to sometmes rely upon one approach and sometmes another, but never exclusvely one or the other; and just as each respectvely has struck a balance between orthodox, doxc and heterodox practces that s relatvely settled, contngent, relatvely flud, and n many ways hstorcally accdental -so too wll practtoners wthn mxed jursdctons, for hstorcally contngent reasons, sometmes feel sufficently ndfferent to, or settled about, or confused about the ntegrty of the overall practce to emphasze mert-drven as opposed to ntegrty-drven responses to legal propostons. And sometmes, agan for reasons that can be emprcally (ethnographcally I would say) apprehended, practtoners wthn mxed jursdctons wll feel sufficently settled or confused about the ntegrty of the overall tradton that they wll be hestant to accept a mert-drven argument for ncorporaton dfference at face value, or alternatvely propelled to accept t because t appears to 'work'. In nether event s there a way of always knowng, n advance, what wll be a benefical and what a pathologcal transformaton of the tradton. Although I agree, for emprcally accessble and hstorcally based reasons (themselves smultaneously descrptvely and normatvely lad out), that reforms to Quebec's matrmonal regmes through ncorporatons from other jursdctons (ncludng the domnant surroundng one located next door n Ontaro) through attendng to how mertorously the nsttuton nteracted wth the needs of newly emancpated Quebec women manfested a benefical transformaton wthn the Cvl law of Quebec, ths assessment s not a blanket endorsement for all ncorporatons, regardless of the partcular hstorcal configuraton of Quebec Cvl law. Openness, n other words, s not a stand-alone vrtue, no matter how often the concept s conjoned wth other normatve terms such as 'maturty'. That 't works' wll never be somethng that can be determned for all ncorporatons n advance outsde of a combnaton of grammatcal and hermeneutcal arguments on the pont. And both grammatcal and hermeneutcal arguments, as Lasser ponted out n hs artcle, wll be marshaled by deology and the poltcal nterests that are met by presentng somethng as the offical and orthodox way thngs are done. And t wll not be possble, n advance, to dstngush whch arguments are merely deologcal, attemptng to assert a new or old orthodoxy by referrng to mert or pragmatsm, or the nvolable core of the tradton; and whch are dead-lne-on-paper efforts to follow the ntegrty of the tradton n ways that wll work best n the crcumstances.
What I have lad out suggests a far more unstable and (n a way that I wll qualfy shortly) hstorcally senstve account of mxté than has been fully manfest n the potental of the subject -though Kasrer's admonton to focus on the dynamcs of the encounter between tradtons s salutary. I have argued that Wttgensten's at tmes vexatously equvocal pont that a rule 'sometmes leaves room for doubt and sometmes not' (both unsatsfyng for ts lack of resoluton and gratfyng for ts healther embrace of the uncertanty n all thngs human and socal) should be appled to understandng the nature of mxté n those jursdctons that are now commonly recognzed as mxed (Quebec, Israel, Lousanna…) . Sometmes t would be healther for a legal tradton to be open to nnovatons 'from away' and only focused on what s mertorous and 'what works'. And sometmes not. And ths s not a phlosophcal problem, but an emprcal one.
I. Rendering Mixité Studies more Dynamic
In any event, t should also be apparent from what I have lad out that the same approach -lookng ethnographcally for the way the tenson plays out between grammatcal and hermeneutcal, or mert-and ntegrty-drven motvatons wthn a legal sensblty -does the same knd of work wthn Common law and Cvl law tradtons ndependently as t does wthn studes of mxté (ndeed Wttgensten's nvestgatons have long been famlar ads n jursprudental studes).
Ths no longer allows the problematc of mxté to reman a taxonomc one. It's not really sufficent to pont out that "most of, f not all, the legal systems of the Western World are mxed" and move swftly on to nsst that the specfic qualficaton of 'mxed' must be coupled wth "a certan measure of mxng or partcular knds of mxng n mnd". It really s not sufficent to look at mxed jursdctons as stable gvens (the soup already cooked, the purée already blended) 185 wth sufficent combnatons of dscrete elements to occupy that specfic corner of the comparatve menu. As the very exercse that generated a 'new famly' of legal tradton for comparatvsts to compare has made clear, the classficaton founded predomnantly on a bfurcaton between Common law and Cvl law s arbtrary and tself hstorcally contngent (typcally contngent upon the empres establshed just pror to the 20 th centures push towards decolonzaton) -though no less heurstcally useful for that.
The problematcs of mxté (even just for example the tenson between mertand ntegrty-drven judgements) characterzes all legal tradtons, just as the proper balance between grammatcal and hermeneutcal approaches to texts surfaces as a conundrum n all tradtons. What s far more nterestng, to me, than the emergence of a new ntermedary taxonomc unt (a new 'famly' of law wth ts own pecular sources, dvsons and concepts, and common hstorcal evoluton) s the way that mxté presents tself as an ssue that cross-cuts all taxonomc orderngs. What the now conventonally accepted (though loosely and also contested) 'mxed jursdctons' (those founded on a blendng of Common law and Cvl law) lend to our understandng of that problematc are strkng examples of the multfarous ways n whch hermeneutcal and grammatcal readngs, or pragmatc and ntegrty-drven arguments, are deployed n stuatons where deologcal domnance and orthodoxy s, or has been, hotly contested; where due to famlar accdents of hstory such as conquest and colonzaton, a perod of cultural and lngustc resstance and or natonalsm figures promnently, creatvely, and often pognantly n dscussons and debates about the nature of law.
The promse of mxté s not so much a New Jerusalem, a place where Common law and Cvl law peacefully cohabt, a shnng beacon for the European Unon and other by-products of globalzaton, but rather a way for comparatvsts to understand the processes that consttuted the old, mundane, actual and anfractuous Jerusalem, however ts jursdcton s construed.
J. Mixité as an Empirical Problem
The reason that I ndcated that the promse n mxté s 'n a qualfied way' hstorcal s also captured n Wttgensten's pont that "sometmes [a sgn post] leaves room for doubt and sometmes not. And now ths s no longer a phlosophcal problem, but an emprcal one."
30 By the word 'emprcal', I do not take t that Wttgensten would say that one could smply read the evdence as one would read a text and the evdence would provde a clear sense of how and why and when a sgn post leaves room for doubt and sometmes not. Indeed that 'grammatcal' readng of emprcal evdence falls prey to the exact same problems that plague exclusvely grammatcal readngs of sgn posts. The nvestgaton (and nvestgator) s more problematcally caught up wth the grammatcal/hermeneutcal conundrum.
And yet, sometmes emprcal accounts (hstorcal n the context I am talkng about) wll concde wth grammatcal readngs of the evdence, and sometmes not. I don't only mean by ths to emphasze the by-now mundane pont about reflexvty. I mean nstead to suggest that the whole enterprse of nvestgat-ng hstorcal accounts s wrapped up tself n an hstorcally contngent mx of stablty and uncertanty, common sense and transgressed understandngs, unquestoned premses and bold new normatvtes. Kasrer's use of the emancpaton of women n Quebec of the 1960s as more or less taken-for-granted socal good to foreground an analogous emancpaton of Quebec law from a French motherland, thereby favorng the normatve value of openness (underlnng ts normatve value by callng t maturty) provdes an excellent example of ths emprcally rooted, relatvely stable and settled approach to the offerng of new normatve apprasals of the vrtues of openness and hybrdty. Once the value of openness has settled as a vrtue (as t seems nclned to do amongst proponents of mxed jursdctons who laud ther subject as at the vanguard of comparatve studes) then a new way of assessng mert (deployng a new ntegrty: maturty) wll be fully ncorporated nto the horzon.
If one were to conduct an emprcal nvestgaton nto when and how and why, and by whom, n partcular socetes, rules were sometmes followed grammatcally and sometmes hermeneutcally, sometmes accordng to pragmatc arguments, sometmes accordng to arguments that harken to the ntegrty of the tradton, such an nvestgaton would ndeed need to look nto partcular hstorcal configuratons and events analogously to the lngustc study of the odd shapes of a language to an outsder.
There s also a trend, however, n mxed jursdcton studes to look at these settled trats of mxed systems, as though each 'system' were a dscrete and solated whole. Ths knd of analyss can also generate hstorcal studes, sometmes relant upon the same knds of chronologes that a hstory focused on flud and more or less unstable processes would generate. Kenneth Red alludes to ths style of thnkng about mxté when he notes that "a strkng characterstc of mxed jursdctons, vewed hstorcally, s ther mutual solaton…f "famly" s the correct term, t s a famly n whch the members were, for many years, estranged and often hardly aware of each others' exstence." The tendency then arses to re-group and categorze all of these dscrete "systems" (because estranged, geographcally and through colonzaton) as the fractured parts of a whole sngular phenomenon, wth a "developed body of mxed jursdctons law [and] a lterature artculatng shared deas and concerns."
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Örücü manfests a bt of ths tendency to veer towards a trat-based hstorcal analyss of partcular mxed jursdctons. "All mxtures dffer," she ponts out, "n the way they have been formed, as ther hstores show". From ths abundance of dstnctveness arses a temptaton to lst off and categorze those dfferences as dscrete sets of settled dstnctons, threatenng an agenda otherwse devoted to understandng mxté as a dynamc phenomenon.
When I say, then, that mxté studes promse to offer productvely destablzng ways of generatng hstorcally senstve accounts of legal tradtons, I don't mean that the taxonomc nclnaton to depct new structures and categores should smply be aded by retrospectve analyss. Descrbng somethng as gazpacho-lke and somethng else as purée-lke doesn't really do the work of sussng out the sometmes ths and sometmes that of the matter; what rather seems to 187 be requred s a senstvty to the hstorcal tensons between offical and unoffical uses of grammatcal or hermeneutc readngs, to the moments n hstory when openness s lauded as a vrtue or deplored as a form of subservence, to the rrtants that prompt ntegrty and prde to recur as themes rather than tolerance and a hunger for alterty.
The Common law and Cvl law tradtons, then, are also ndependently about mxté, about the healthy and/or troubled mx of necessty and contngency that characterzes all forms of human actvty, ncludng law. Mxté, then, s not really about depctng the features of a thrd famly of law. It s rather a core fulcrum of comparatve studes, as the long standng debate about legal transplants suggests. Studyng the processes of mxté (perhaps n partcular n locales, such as the classcal 'mxed jursdctons', where the process of mxng s dfficult and conflcted and lnked to a complex range of collectve goods) should long ago have taken over as a way of dong comparatve work; as a way of gettng away from (not compoundng) classficatons and taxonomes.
K. Ethnographic Accounts of Mixité
Ths brngs me to the last comment I want to make about Lasser's work wthn the French legal system. As Wttgensten's alluson to emprcal problems suggest (and s suggested n general n hs recurrent admonton to "look and see"), understandng the subtletes of the places where a form of lfe has settled nto a stable practce and where t seems more open to debate and nnovaton, or gettng to the pont of understandng where and why offical portrats are undermned or shored up, requres somethng dfferent than ether devsng a taxonomy or settng out an agenda of preferences for values such as pragmatsm or mert or openness. It requres, rather, the knd of ethnographc nvestgaton that Lasser launched upon n France.
In order to uncover a sense of the contngency and necessty (both apparent and seemngly ncontrovertble) of natve legal dscourse, Lasser sought to go beyond the publc face of the tradton, one that can be captvatng to both outsders and nsders alke. Instead, by nhabtng the world of French legal practce, he slowly habtuated hmself to the anfractuous language of French law, talkng to nsders, attendng and partcpatng n the ntrcate workngs of the practce. He lstened to the multple voces of reasonable and commtted legal actors who routnely make sense of, and crtque, ther own legal system. As I suggested above, ths was not merely a process of readng from the evdence, but was guded by a pror sense that necessty and contngency (or grammatcal and hermeneutcal readngs n Lasser's case, or mert-and ntegrtydrven judgments n Glenn's case) both are mutually ndspensable components of graspng a meanng or makng a judgment. And though the groups Lasser nvestgated tend to present thngs as beng prmarly one or the other, he was curous about exactly how both are present n dfferent places, and why, and who wants t to be so. Under the auspces of ths knd of emprcsm, t's dfficult to perceve the other (whether a mxed tradton or not) as a monolthc and statc object of analyss.
Ths approach to alterty (whch s also an approach to self ) would be well posed to get at the dynamcs of encounter wth whch Kasrer (and I) would prefer to supplant taxonomes of mxté. In the first place, there s a hermeneutc dynamc at the very heart of ethnographc enqury that ensures that the results of nvestgaton wll reflect the ever shftng hstorcal processes set n play. Ths s the omnpresent ethnographc preoccupaton wth how much of the settled parts of self have skewed the percepton of salence n the other -a dynamc of nqury that smultaneously unsettles the stablty of pror arrangements as self and other become self-conscous of alternatves through the process of nqury.
The approach s also tonc because n the attempt to understand why a partcular configuraton of necessty and contngency has arsen as t has (or 'who wants t to be so?' and 'what's at stake?'), the ethnographc enterprse that Lasser embarked upon seems better equpped to deal wth the constantly shftng ways that deology nteracts wth 'the way thngs are done'.
And ths approach overall occurs to me as somethng that could be nstructve n expandng our understandng of the classcally mxed jursdcton of Israel, but perhaps more mportant, also nstructve n understandng the phenomenon of mxté tself. I say ths partcularly because the taxonomc model appled to Israel seems so ntutvely ll-equpped to descrbe the dynamcs of encounter n that regon that are so promnent n the world's magnaton (no doubt overly promnent) as to be conspcuously absent n taxonomc accounts.
A focus on Israel's complex and often angushed mxté makes t very dfficult to gnore the tenson-filled and warrng dmensons not nfrequently characterstc of legal mxng -exactly where mxed legal studes would prefer us to focus on settled mxed jursdctons, on places where jursdcton and terrtory are no longer so openly n dspute. The rawness of Israel's bellum jurdcum -or at least the rawness n evdence when we refuse to lmt ourselves n our wanderng to the comfortable settlng between cvl law and common law n Israel's hstory -allows us to revst the hstorcal moment n most mxed jursdctons when bellum gave survvng mxed jursdctons ther leadng characterstc.
IV. Bellum Juridicum
A. An Ethos in Each Banal Transaction
A recurrng theme n wrtngs on mxté -ndeed one of the themes that Vernon Palmer notes s "dstnctvely "mxed jursdcton" and typcally receve[s] no attenton n other forums" -s that of bellum jurdcum. The conage of the Latn phrase appears to have been fashoned by Afrkaners n the last century as a summaton of ther struggles to consoldate the jursdcton of Roman Dutch Cvl law aganst the encroachment of colonal Brtsh Common law n a manoeuvre that was smultaneously mert-and ntegrty-drven; amng smultaneously to "create a more transparent and thus predctable system through a thorough organzaton of the law" 32 and to entrench cultural and poltcal dentty. Whatever the conage of the synoptc Latn phrase bellum jurdcum, the conjuncton of serous legal debate wth the struggle to preserve the hegemony of one legal tradton over the other farly consstently characterzes hstorcal struggles endemc to most, f not all, of the classcal mxed jursdctons. The tense apprehenson of mundane legal manoeuvres as consttutve of a larger cultural struggle appears more promnently n mxed jursdctons, no doubt reflectng hstores more fraught wth ntra-collectve tenson. What would be commonplace ex-
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Israel and Legal Mixité 189 changes and transactons n a pacfic settng, carry a freght of perls, often panstakngly temzed n a manner that perhaps only a lawyer would find ntutve.
Ths njecton of ntegrty focus and dentty poltcs nto even the most prosac of nteractons s tself pecularly akn to an ethnographc sensblty. The ethos of each banal transacton s exhaustngly summoned to mnd n way famlar to the ethnographc field worker. In the case of the commtted cvlan n a Common law domnated context, the nsder s ever and smultaneously alert to the way that a manoeuvre resolves a dspute at the same that that resoluton fits wthn a larger legal sensblty. Ths struggle to stand outsde of the tradton to apprehend ts nner logc whle apprehendng how the nner logc works n partcular crcumstances s akn to what Lasser dd n hs study of the French legal system.
As I have noted above, ths state of smultaneous alertness to both partcular and general ramficatons s characterstc of those most proficent wthn the Common law and Cvl law ndependently, .e., t s a phenomenon that runs through not only mxed jursdctons. And both tradtons are rddled wth moments where the ntegrty of the whole was renewed or constructed aganst a real or magned fol. The more persstent proto-ethnographc acuty wthn mxed jursdctons, however, seems to be more honed, or perhaps slghtly dfferently honed. Perhaps the ntrgung dfference for mxed jursdctons s the more ntensely self-conscous focus not just on how the tradton works as a whole and n partcular, but, gven ts checkered hstory of proxmty to the other, how t works alongsde or aganst an opposng tradton. The dfference mght be analogzed to the work that therapsts do (treatng an ndvdual who s part of a nexus of relatonshps that he or she brngs nto the therapeutc encounter), as opposed to the work of couples' counsellors, whose focus s more mmedately upon the relatonshp tself.
Focusng on mxed jursdctons such as Israel, perhaps most partcularly when relatonshps are frayed, provdes an opportunty to look more closely at the processes that create the dstnctve legal self, as well as the one that s ndscrmnate and promscuous, or thrown nto confuson, or subservent. Israel s often portrayed, however, as an atypcal mxed system on the bellum jurdcum model fixed on the axes of a domneerng Common law beng kept at bay by a beleaguered Cvl law.
B. Israel's Peculiar Mixité
In the first event (and one that I want to eventually hghlght more starkly), the Ottoman Empre that preceded both the Brtsh Mandate and the State of Israel n the regon easly meets the second of three features that Vernon Palmer lays out as characterstc of mxté:
The Ottomans, by vrtue of grantng judcal jursdcton to foregn powers over ther own subjects (allowng for an encroachment on prncple of terrtoralty) and by vrtue of grantng a broad jursdcton to relgous courts of often transnatonal reach on both relgous and personal status matters would have passed a quanttatve threshold "of sufficent proportons as to strke a neutral observer as obvous", whch Palmer sets as a strkng psychologcal feature of mxté -the second feature.
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The hstorcal example of the Ottoman Empre, based on a predomnant component of Muslm law mngled (partcularly n the 19 th century) wth Cvl law undermnes the first feature that Palmer dentfies as the core of the "Thrd Famly" of law -namely those systems bult upon the dual foundatons of Common law and Cvl law materals. 34 In lght of a qualfied (but, I wll argue, stll hugely sgnficant) perpetuaton of the Ottoman fracturng of relgous jursdcton n the domans of famly law and personal status n the State of Israel, the bnary nature of the way that mxté s construed n the lterature fragments and dssolves n ntrgung ways n Israel/Palestne.
Cela Wassersten Fassberg's contrbuton to the Frst Worldwde Congress on Mxed Jursdctons hghlghts ths anomalous feature of the Israel's mxté -.e., the reduced salence of the Common law/Cvl law opposton as a source of tenson. 35 Although there were early ntegrty-drven tensons between both the Common law comng out of the Brtsh mandate, as well as early tensons about the language wth whch the Israel system should be nfused, these tensons dd not long persst. And, n a trajectory uncommon to other stuatons of mxté, 36 Cvl law superseded the presence of Common law n Israel wth the huge nflux of cvlan jursts from contnental jursdctons followng the Holocaust who left ther mprnt on both the legal academy and the structure and substance of Israel law.
Further, as Fassberg ponts out, mxté's characterstc conjuncton of legal and lngustc struggles aganst a domnant Anglo/Common law fol were not present n Israel. Nether Englsh nor contnental languages prevaled n Israel legalese. Hebrew swftly became the domnant language of law.
And yet, as Fassberg ntrgungly lays out, for reasons partcular to nternal developments wthn Talmudc law, and for reasons assocated wth the lterary and rhetorcal nature of modern Hebrew, a more strkng tenson between the two predomnantly secular tradtons of the Western World and Jewsh law was not prevalent at the establshment of the new Jewsh state. As she notes, a number of explanatons have been offered for the falure of Jewsh law to become the model for the new Israel legal system. It has been sad that the thrty years pror to the establshment of the state were among the least productve n the long hstory of Jewsh law, and that the rabbncal establshment had mssed the opportunty to develop Jewsh law n a number of areas crucal to modern lfe--contracts, torts, She also ponts out that the decson was coloured by pragmatc delberatons. "The lmted resources of the poltcal establshment," she notes, had to be marshalled to deal wth more mmedate problems such as war and massve mmgraton; the accumulated experence of the world has not produced a very broad range of models for legal systems, and the challenge of nventng an orgnal model s formdable, holdng the rsk of creatng legal vacuums. Perhaps more mportantly, there were very few lawyers among the leaders of the socalst Zonst movement.
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At least at the ncepton of the state, whch was more predomnantly secular and socalst than t s today, Jewsh natonal dentty was not prncpally generated out of the confluence of law and culture or naton. At least at the ncepton of Israel, nether Common law, nor Cvl law, nor relgous law were cast as salent antnomes n a bellum jurdcum. Integrty-drven judgments were backgrounded to the pragmatc concerns of developng a body of prncples, statutes and jursprudence that could resolve dsputes n a manner that gave ncreasng legtmacy to the nchoate legal system. It mattered less that a legal proposton was cvlan or Common law n orgn than that t worked -and certanly mattered less than t would to a cvlan n other mxed jursdctons. Although Wassersten hghlghts the reduced sgnficance of the characterstc Common law/Cvl law mxté tenson n Israel, both she, and Goldsten before her n hs contrbuton to Palmer's edted opus on the world's mxed jursdctons, downplay the sgnficance of the tensons that have subsequently arsen to central promnence, and persst, between Israel's relgous and secular legal tradtons.
39 Just as comparatve law texts of the 19 th and 20 th centures routnely devoted a hugely preponderant amount of focus to Cvl law and Common law and reserved margnal and cursory treatment for the other legal tradtons of the world, the mxture of Common law and Cvl law figures promnently n dscussons of Israel mxté and the otherwse hghly salent tenson between state and relgon (not just n Israel but ncreasngly around the world) s relegated and contaned wthn the prvate branch of law known as famly law.
Yet the alter aganst whch a secular Israel/Palestne s composed, ncreasngly f not orgnally, s relgous law, prncpally Talmudc and Islamc. In lght of the almost nescapable presence of the poltcal tensons around these partcular sets of axes n the publc magnaton (Jewsh law and state law, Muslm law and state law, Jewsh dentty and Arab dentty (Chrstan and Muslm), relgous law and secular law), t s surprsng that they figure so unremarkably n the lterature on Israel mxté. To the extent that relatons have not been domestcated and normalzed n the way that they have between Common law and Cvl n Israel, the 37 Fassberg, supra note 3 at 174 38 Ibid. 39 See Steven Goldsten n supra note 3. resdual, sometmes volent, tenson along these axes s one of the most strkng features of Israel's mxté. 40 It s also one of the features that almost paradgmatcally showcases the bellum jurdcum of mxté and provdes an opportunty to explore the less pacfic dmensons of the dynamc of encounter that (as Palmer also ponts out) runs through mxté as a recurrng theme. The tenson also leaves a comparatvst posed, I would suggest, to explore the dalogue between mert-and ntegrty drven judgements n a settng, unlke contemporary Quebec n Canada or Scotland n Brtan where a level of (albet precarous) comfort and complacence about cultural dentty has shfted nto the background so that grammatcal or mert-drven readngs of the law can predomnate.
As Fassberg ponts out, Israel's Common law/Cvl law mx s sufficently tangental to the core dentty poltcs of Israel/Palestne that t s characterzed by a nonchalance regardng whch predomnates that s uncommon to the other classcally mxed legal jursdctons. Whatever works, now seems to be the prevalng ethos wth regard to Europe's two leadng legal tradtons. Mert-drven judgments about whch solutons from whch of these legal tradtons provde the most salutary soluton have an easer field n Israel/Palestne than they would n jursdctons such as Scotland or Quebec.
Though perhaps not orgnally pertnent, the relgous law/secular law mx n Israel/Palestne s now far more fraught wth the dentty poltcs that Quebec and Scotland have tended to reserve for Cvl law. In ths regard, Israel/Palestne s embarked upon a dspute that now characterzes many western states; gven ts geographcal locaton, t also happens to be at the very epcentre of that rsng bnary opposton. Integrty-drven or ntegrty-drven judgments can be expected to figure promnently over pragmatc solutons that make the most sense n the crcumstances.
The ways n whch the balance between mert and dentty works out n ether of these domans would make nterestng papers n and of themselves. However the more salent tenson between Israels and Palestnans (a subset of whch tenson ncludes relgous legal dentty), and the way that ths tenson gets exstentally deployed n the mundane world of food s what preoccupes the rest of ths artcle. Ths focus hopefully allows for a more robust way of assessng the manfold ways n whch mert-and ntegrty-drven judgments come to the fore or recede n mportance and are at the servce of a range of agendas.
V. DIShINg IT UP
Ths brngs me back to my wanderngs through the Old Cty of Jerusalem at the outset of ths artcle. Elements of that prosac amblng would appear nnocuous to a vstor, as ndeed they mght have to those most habtuated to the jumbled streets and alleys of the Old Cty. It s hard to see whch of the elements are fraught, f any, f not all. Those thngs that an outsder mght find salent and 40 One suspects that the weary and angushed fatgue wth a state of affars where thngs seem to hold lttle hope of ever beng normalzed generates a longng to focus on those tensons n law that, lke Quebec and Scotland, have moved more comfortably, f somewhat precarously, nto the background.
ntrgung, one more habtuated mght find commonplace; and vce versa. A classc example of the smultaneous banalty and pognancy of events, perpherally related to law, are the actvtes surroundng Memoral and Independence Day n Israel. Memoral Day s devoted to the memory of those who have gven ther lves to the State of Israel. Ceremones are held throughout the country at schools, cemeteres, and memoral stes. Lacrmonous songs domnate the arwaves. A one-mnute sren s blown on the eve of Memoral Day and a two-mnute sren s blown on the mornng of Memoral Day (the end of whch also marks the begnnng of Independence Day). Durng the sren, the whole country, t seems, comes to a standstll -people stop workng, chldren stop playng, and traffic comes to a halt as drvers step out of ther cars to stand n slence as the sren wals n memory of the fallen. For Jewsh Israels, the day s dfficult and emotonal; partcularly as t lurches from mournng to the joyous celebratons of Independence Day.
Ths sprng, I was told by several people n the Old Cty that Arab and Armenan café owners at the Jaffa gate had been approached by the polce several days pror to the event and told that (though under no legal oblgaton to do so, the Palestnan Israels nformed me) they had to shut down for Memoral Day wth veled threats made, compounded by crculatng rumours, that t they faled to do so, ther shops would be vandalzed at nght.
Jewsh Israels I spoke wth, themselves caught up by the ntense emotonalty of the memorals, sad t was normal for the polce to vst the shop owners; there was a legal oblgaton to comply and the polce were provdng a servce by lettng them know they were lable for a fine (a banal event).
Whether there s n fact a law oblgatng Arab shop owners to close on Memoral Day s to a large extent rrelevant to ths account n whch formal statemposed memoralzng would further compound the dssonance between dsparate sense-makng of the event. I came across many settngs n whch the dsjuncture between Jewsh and Arab responses to Memoral and Independence Day has been for years a source of acute and angushed debate, compounded by the fact that Independence Day for Jewsh Israels s the exact same event as the Naqbah, or catastrophe, for Arab Israels. The YMCA day-care n Jerusalem, for example, has not only both Arab and Jewsh Israel staff and chldren n ther care, they have an annual conundrum about whether the day-care should brng the Arab chldren out onto the streets to wtness the moment of slence or segregate the two groups of chldren on that day, or smply declne to recognze the moment nsttutonally.
Sngle events that are rtual, routne, and understood by one group are pognant and panful for the other. Thngs that are part of the backdrop of a routne lfe for one group are at the forefront of cuttng dstnctons for another. Whch thngs are the background and whch the foreground s not determned, lke Wttgensten's arrow, by the thng tself, "…but only n the applcaton that a lvng beng makes of t." 41 In the prose amblngs from the outset of ths artcle, the Israel taxng of Kareem's tea busness and hs refusal to pay, or the style and moment of mnglng that s Jewsh/Arab commerce, are matters that mght be depcted, alternatvely, as banal or pregnant wth larger meanng. It's qute possble to magne that matters laced wth ntrgue and urgency at one hstorcal moment mght become commonplaces of the past. Though harder to magne n the contemporary moment, the "separaton"/"aparthed" wall and the ubqutous posters of ts constructon on Palestnan walls could become as much of the background as the warm, Jerusalem stone facets of the wall that surrounds the Muslm, Armenan, Chrstan, and Jewsh quarters of the Old Cty.
And so, although the prose amblngs mght render salent dfferent thngs at dfferent moments to dfferent observers, I'm gong to focus on one element n the amblngs that would lkely seem nnocuous to an outsder as well as (most lkely) to the nhabtants of the scenaro -that s the food; the rce-stuffed cabbage leaves, the so-called "Israel salad", the hummous, the falafel….
A. Food's Potent Banality
Whatever else was salent n the scenaros, the food, as we were takng t n, was pretty much matter-of-factly absorbed as a measure of the quotdan. And yet t too embodes the potental of everythng to be nfused wth the drama of alterty, to carry a weghty cargo of dentty, just as the law tends to do n mxed jursdctons -an ethos conveyed n each banal transacton.
The proclvty of a partcular dsh to absorb (along wth flavour and nutrents) hstory, deology, and soco-economc nuance s not a partcularly new revelaton. It has long been recognzed, for example, that cookbooks play a socally ddactc role, that socal class prearranges our tastes, and that efforts to corral mmgrants and the 'lower classes' nto a natonal and poltcal consensus often started, sometmes ntrusvely, generally nsdously, wth ther food practces.
Anthropologsts and cultural hstorans have elaborated upon the poltcs of tradng, purchasng, preparng, and consumng food. 42 And they have also expanded upon the ntra-socetal sgnficance of food practces to lnk them to the ways n whch food s used (as s law) to reproduce class, gender, cultural, and natonal dentty. As Bourdeu has elaborated n hs semnal work on the topc of taste, class structures, once n place, replcate themselves through a myrad of subtle markers of dstncton. Not only do class dfferences profoundly dvde access to the resource of food, both n quantty and qualty, these dfferences are further entrenched by a seres of sgnfyng stratficatons that hghlght class dstncton. So, for example, fish mght be construed as an effemnate food for workng class men 43 whle fresh vegetables and lean meat mark the dets of the 195 elte. So, for example, n Canada, a current televson ad has, ostensbly, a workng Joe renforce to hs son (whle hs cunnng wfe s n the background at the stove preparng and servng the meal) assocatons between the consumpton of "healthy" food and the effete and pathetc neghbours -all the whle unwttngly consumng the whole wheat pasta that hs wfe has surrepttously slpped under hs spaghett sauce. These are the knds of fine-graned assocatons of food preferences wth class alluded to by Bourdeu that are subtly nculcated, generaton to generaton. Hasa Dner underlnes ths capacty for food to facltate socal reproducton when she notes that "…both systems of food and sexualty strengthen bonds between group members and create barrers to nteractons wth outsders. Put bluntly, the person wth whom one cannot eat (and whose food cannot be consumed) s often the same person wth whom sexual relatons must be avoded. Food, lke sex, ntensfies group dentty."
44
Further lnks between food and sexualty have been connected around the axs of gender, suggestng that the sgnficance of food, lke law, resonates on many regsters of socal lfe, wthn all socetes. Dner remarks upon how "gender, understood as any culture's knowledge of, and belefs about, sexual dfference would come nto play around food." Not only are dfferent roles and rtuals assgned to dfferent domans of nteracton wth food gatherng, preparaton, and consumpton, extensve fields of socal lfe are organzed accordng to these foodrelated assgnatons of role and rtual. Even subtle dsruptons and conformty to those assgnatons carry mport for the larger culture as a whole. It can matter as much to self-conceptons of the western world that women do not only serve the men the food they have cooked, do not only eat after the men have finshed, and do not deny themselves partcular food tems, as t matters n other socetes that they do. For an ndvdual woman wthn ether settng to dsrupt or conform to expected norms says as much about the socal arrangement as a whole as t says about her ndvdual actons.
Where Bourdeu notes, n hs semnal work on the topc of taste, that "taste classfies, and t classfies the classfier", the same knds of sgnfyng stratficatons that he hghlghts along the lnes of class can be observed between cultural and natonal groups. Indeed the elaborate and nuanced taxonomes of ntrasocal dstnctons are often the same ones that feed nto natonal and terrtoral jursdctons. What and how a group eats, who prepares food and how, and wth whom food s consumed have marked the 'natural' borders between the peoples whose self-determnaton s lnked to statehood, agan n a manner that has some analoges to the ways n whch a style of adjectval and substantve law has dstngushed common from Cvl law jursdctons, and the vsceral way that an mposed natonal border can feel lke a volaton of the natural order, an affront to communty tastes and values.
Food Israel cusne s portrayed n cookng columns and televson programs as an end-of-days vson-come-true: Gefilte fish shall dwell wth hilbeh (Yemente fenugreek dp), n equalty and brotherhood. On the surface, t s a cusne that puts the theory of natonal-culnary fuson nto practce, takng the finest spces and cookng styles of Israel's varous ethnc communtes, and whppng up a marvellous dsh that untes East and West, Jew and Arab, rch and poor.
49
A Full Belly, she notes, offers a more sober vew of the status of food n Israel socety. The revew, mrrorng the book, offers a range of socologcal crtques of food, ncludng analyss of how ethnc dshes n Israel socety reflect the standng of the communtes assocated wth them, of how Israel socety attempted to carve out a normatve dentty for tself through food socalzaton, and of the nteractons between the domestc and natonal spheres reflected n natonal food gudes.
There s a further feature of Israel food as a socologcal phenomenon that mrrors, to some extent, the knds of antnomc tensons between relgous and secular law that seem oddly backgrounded n accounts of mxté, wth the most upsettng encounters left out. Ths s the way that food, as an dea or cultural marker, feeds flashpont tensons between opposng cultural and natonal groups n Israel/Palestne, symbolzed by the way that, as Jod Kantor puts t, the humble chck pea contans a hstory rpe wth Mddle Eastern poltcs. 50 Just as the law can be nnocuous and commonplace or can be a substtute for a panoply of secondary tensons, food can be marshalled for war. And one of the tems n my prose amblngs that ordnarly would go relatvely unnotced (namely food) can rapdly lose ts quotent of nutrtonal mert (good taste, nutrtonal balance) and take on deologcal proportons.
Kantor's artcle focuses on how the ways that hstorcally Palestnan foods such as tahna, hummus, falafel, and pta bread are now markers of Israelness, an appropraton that sets Palestnan teeth on edge. Falafel, n partcular, has become a locus of Israel-Palestnan poltcs, not solated to the Mddle East. Canadans wll recollect that one dmenson of the tensons between Jews and Palestnans at Concorda Unversty n 2002 was focused on food: two days after the campus was shaken by volent protests over the Mddle East, a Palestnan student at orentaton week accused a Jewsh group of cultural theft for stealng
